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Abstract
In this contribution the author examines how, from a cus-
toms perspective, the integrity of the internal market is pro-
tected after the transitional phase under the Revised Proto-
col on Ireland/Northern Ireland. He briefly discusses the cus-
toms aspects of the Withdrawal Agreement and then exam-
ines in depth the revised arrangement with regard to the
Irish border in light of the protection of the integrity of the
internal market. He shows that the revised arrangement
cleared the Brexit deal through parliament and paved the
UK’s way to leave the EU on 31 January 2020. He con-
cludes, however, that given the complexity of the legislation
underlying the revised arrangement, the UK will be paying a
high price for getting Brexit done, keeping the Irish border
open and protecting the integrity of the internal market of
the EU.
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After several years of negotiation the Withdrawal Agree-
ment between the UK and the EU has been agreed.1 On
31 January 2020 the UK formally left the EU and is no
longer a member state of the EU. However, as will be
explained below, this is probably not the end of the
Brexit saga.
The Withdrawal Agreement contains a transition peri-
od, which ends on 31 December 2020. During this peri-
od the UK remains part of both the EU customs union
and the internal market. The UK will already be able to
sign and ratify free trade agreements with non-EU
countries.
In principle, after 31 December 2020, withdrawal from
the EU customs union and internal market will take
place. The UK parliament has even adopted a law
determining that the transition period cannot be exten-
ded beyond 31 December 2020.
The preference of the UK is clear: withdrawal from the
EU customs union and internal market as of 1 January
2021. The big question is whether this will be feasible.
The UK and EU aim to conclude a free trade agree-
ment, and it remains to be seen whether negotiation
time of less than a year is sufficient for that. Under nor-
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1. Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European
Atomic Energy Community, 2019, OJ C 384 I/1.
mal circumstances, negotiating a free trade agreement
takes several years, while the prospect of a fast negotia-
tion is also dimmed by the different views of the EU and
the UK on the content and scope of such agreement.2
Another important feature of the Withdrawal Agree-
ment is the arrangement to solve the issue of the Irish
border, i.e. the border between Northern Ireland and
the Irish Republic. That issue has been solved with the
Revised Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland (here-
after, the Protocol).3 This article focuses on the solution
for the Irish border as agreed in the Protocol and what it
will mean in practice for the future relationship between
the EU and the UK.
1 Brief Overview of the
Withdrawal Agreement from
a Customs Perspective
In brief, the solution for the Irish border is Northern
Ireland remaining under EU customs legislation as of
1 January 2021 while the UK leaves the customs union.
At the same time, Northern Ireland will remain part of
the UK customs territory. However, before going into
more detail, I first provide a brief overview of the With-
drawal Agreement and its arrangements for customs and
trade.
During the transition period (1 February 2020 to
31 December 2020) included in the revised Withdrawal
Agreement, the UK will remain part of the EU Customs
Union and the Internal Market, including the four free-
doms.4 This means that trade between the UK and the
EU will be conducted in the same manner as during the
time the UK was a member state of the EU. No customs
duties will be applied on products coming from the UK
to the EU and vice versa. During the transition period
2. See for example: Financial Times, 1 March 2020, ‘The UK’s threat to
walk out of EU trade talks is real’; The Guardian, 5 March 2020, ‘Barni-
er warns of grave differences between EU and UK in trade talks’.
3. Revised Protocol Ireland/Northern Ireland, 17 October 2019, TF50
(2019) 64-Commission to EU 27.
4. European Council (2018), Council Decision supplementing the Council
Decision of 22 May 2017 authorising the opening of negotiations with
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for an agree-
ment setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal from the Europe-
an Union, XT 21004/18 COR 2.
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customs formalities and controls in trade between the
UK and the EU are therefore unnecessary. From a
VAT and excise duty perspective, the rules and mecha-
nisms for intra-EU trade will continue to be applied
without border formalities being imposed.
The transition period can be extended, but the UK
needs to apply for this by 1 July 2020. However, the UK
government has made clear that they do not wish to
extend the transition period and want an agreement
with the EU in place by the end of 2020. This means
that in 2020 a lot of negotiating work will need to be
done by both the UK and the EU to complete a new
trade agreement that will then apply as of 1 January
2021.
It should be noted that given this tight schedule, the
danger of a hard Brexit is far from over. If the UK and
the EU fail to reach an agreement, then both parties will
have to fall back on the WTO scenario, i.e. imposing
their Most Favoured Nation duty rates on each other’s
products (with the UK still needing to set their own
Most Favoured Nation duty rates).5
Contrary to the draft Withdrawal Agreement, the
revised Withdrawal Agreement intends to introduce a
permanent solution for the Irish border.6 According to
the EU Commission:
The revised Protocol is no longer an insurance policy
that applies unless and until the EU and the UK con-
clude a subsequent agreement that replaces it in part
or in full. It is a fully legally operative solution that
will continue to apply unless it fails to receive the
democratic support of the Northern Ireland Assem-
bly.7
In the remainder of this article the arrangement with
regard to the Irish border is further examined. As will
be discussed later, this arrangement is unique in the his-
tory of the EU customs union, but very complicated,
triggering the question of whether it can be implement-
ed in time (i.e. before the end of 2020).
2 Revised Protocol Ireland/
Northern Ireland
The Protocol was agreed on 17 November 2019.
Compared with the draft Protocol negotiated by former
Prime Minister May (and rejected three times by UK
parliament) it contains a new approach with regard to
the Irish border. Under the initial draft Protocol the
5. See: I. Hallak, EPRS, EU Parliament Briefing, Future EU-UK trade rela-
tionship, February 2020, in which different scenarios, including a hard
Brexit, are described.
6. On the draft Withdrawal Agreement of 2018, which was rejected by
UK Parliament, see: Eileen Connely and John Doyle, Brexit and the Irish
Border, EJLS Special issue, October 2019, pp. 153-186.
7. European Commission, Questions & Answers, What did you agree
today?, 17 October 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_19_6122.
UK as a whole would remain in the EU customs union
until a solution for the Irish border had been found (the
Irish backstop). It failed to pass UK parliament, one of
the main reasons being the possible ‘indefinite’ stay
within the customs union. This would make it impossi-
ble for the UK to conclude its own free trade agree-
ments with third countries. Being able to conclude own
free trade agreements and the possibility to manage its
own customs tariff were important conditions for the
UK government and the majority of the UK parliament.
Neither would be possible if the UK remained in a cus-
toms union with the EU.
Under the Withdrawal Agreement and the Protocol,
Northern Ireland remains part of the customs territory
of the UK, while the UK itself leaves the customs
union. This means that free trade agreements concluded
by the UK with third countries also apply to goods pro-
duced in Northern Ireland, while on entry into North-
ern Ireland goods coming from these third countries
benefit from preferential duty treatment.
The border between Northern Ireland and Ireland will
remain open, i.e. no checks and border controls will take
place, and no tariffs will be applied both ways. Instead,
these checks and border controls will take place between
the UK and Northern Ireland.8 The solution agreed to
protect the integrity of the internal market is, simply
stated, that the UK collects import duties on third
country goods destined for the EU (i.e. Ireland) and on
goods coming from the other parts of the UK into
Northern Ireland. To complement this arrangement,
Northern Ireland will still be applying the Union Cus-
toms Code (UCC) and a substantial amount of other EU
legislation, all aimed at aligning Northern Ireland with
internal market rules of the EU.9 The overall aim is, of
course, to maintain a frictionless border between Ireland
and Northern Ireland.
3 Goods Destined for the EU,
the Customs Regime
As mentioned previously, as of 1 January 2021 (assum-
ing a trade agreement between the EU and the UK has
by then been concluded or, alternatively, a hard Brexit
has taken place), the UK will collect import duties on
behalf of the EU on goods destined for the EU. In the
Protocol this arrangement has been included in Article 5
(Customs, movement of goods).
Article 5(1) determines that no customs duties will be
levied on goods brought into Northern Ireland from
another part of the UK by direct transport, unless those
goods are at risk of subsequently being moved into the
EU. Further, it is determined there that in case goods
8. However, see the Times of 23 February 2020: ‘Brexit team seeks to
evade Irish Sea checks on goods’.
9. Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ L
269, 10 October 2013, pp. 1-101).
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are being moved to Northern Ireland from other coun-
tries than the UK and the EU countries, the customs
duties of the UK will apply, unless that good is at risk of
subsequently being moved to the EU.10, 11
The big question is when goods should be considered to
be at risk of subsequently being moved into the EU.
Article 5(2) stipulates that for the purposes of Article
5(1) of the Protocol:12
(…) a good brought into Northern Ireland from out-
side the Union shall be considered to be at risk of
subsequently being moved into the Union unless it is
established that that good:
a. will not be subject to commercial processing in
Northern Ireland; and
b. fulfils the criteria established by the Joint Com-
mittee in accordance with the fourth subparagraph
of this paragraph. (…)
On the basis of Article 5(2) it can be concluded that with
regard to goods being moved into Northern Ireland
from outside the EU (thus, including goods from other
parts of the UK), the legal presumption is made that
they are at risk of being moved into the EU and that EU
customs duties against the EU duty rates should be lev-
ied.
Only if goods are not subject to further processing in
Northern Ireland and fulfil the criteria established by
the Joint Committee, the goods will not be considered to
be at risk of moving into the EU.13 It follows that goods
that are further processed in Northern Ireland are
always assumed to be at risk of moving to the EU and
are thus subject to EU customs duties on arrival. Since
the UCC applies in and to Northern Ireland, I assume
that businesses wanting to process goods from other
parts of the UK or from outside the EU can (or should)
apply the special procedure of inward processing to
avoid EU duty payment on components in case the fin-
ished goods are meant to stay in Northern Ireland or go
back to the other parts of the UK. However, what will
happen on release from the procedure into free circula-
tion remains unclear: should UK duties or EU duties be
applied? The Protocol does not answer that question. I
would assume that UK duties will apply as the goods
are intended to stay in Northern Ireland or go back to
the other parts of the UK. If the goods are intended to
10. See https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/brexit-deal-
northern-ireland-protocol; here the customs arrangements to solve the
Irish border issue are explained in brief.
11. See also: C. Cîrlig, ‘The revised Brexit deal: what has changed and next
steps’, EPRS, European Parliament, October 2019.
12. An important exception is being made for personal property of residents
of the UK, brought into Northern Ireland from another part of the UK.
This follows from the third paragraph of Art. 5(1) of the Protocol.
According to Art. 5(7) also consignments of negligible value, travellers’
personal luggage and goods shipped from one individual to another are
not subject to duties.
13. Processing is defined as any alteration of goods, any transformation or
any operation other than for preserving them in good condition or for
adding or affixing marks, labels, seals and documentation to comply
with specific requirements.
go to the EU, then, obviously, EU duties should be
applied. Regular audits will be necessary after comple-
tion of the processing to determine whether goods
actually stayed in the UK or went to the EU in order to
determine which duties should be applied.
If goods are not subject to further processing, it has to
be determined whether they can be considered to be at
risk of being moved to the EU. For these goods, criteria
will be determined by the Joint Committee, according to
Article 5(2) of the Protocol. Having regard to the specif-
ic circumstances of Northern Ireland, the Joint Com-
mittee decides on the criteria, taking the following into
consideration:
a. the final destination and use of the good;
b. the nature and value of the good;
c. the nature of the movement; and
d. the incentive for undeclared onward-movement into
the Union, in particular incentives resulting from the
duties payable pursuant to paragraph 1 (of Article 5,
WdW).
It seems to me that the nature and value of the goods
(apart from the obvious final destination and use of the
goods) will be the most important considerations for
determining whether a risk is present. In my view it will
be a difficult task for the Joint Committee to come up
with clear and objective criteria that can be easily
applied in practice. The ‘nature’ of the goods is a rather
subjective criterion. It should be considered to define ‘at
risk’ goods on the basis of the classification in the Com-
bined Nomenclature combined with a minimum value.
In my view this would be the only way to objectify the
‘at risk’ criterion on the basis of the nature and value of
the goods.
It is obvious, however, that the consideration mentioned
under d) is also important. I assume that this refers to
products that are subject to high duty rates in the EU
(e.g. agricultural goods, apparel and shoes). It appears
that such goods can be classified as being ‘at risk’ up
front and thus subject to the EU duty rates. In this case
the Joint Committee will also need to determine specifi-
cally for which goods this consideration applies.14
The role of EU customs law in the UK and Northern
Ireland is further explained in Articles 5(3) and 5(6) of
the Protocol. Article 5(3) first determines that legisla-
tion defined in Article 5(2) of the UCC applies to and in
the UK in respect of Northern Ireland. The legislation
mentioned there is the UCC, the EU Customs Tariff,
legislation with respect to relief from customs duties
and international agreements relating to customs regula-
tion applicable to the EU. In other words, the whole
body of customs legislation of the EU also applies to and
in the UK in respect of Northern Ireland.
Article 5(6) of the Protocol determines that the UK may
(with regard to duties levied according to Article 5(3)
(so EU duties)):
14. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/
756375/14_November_Technical_Explanatory_Note_Arts_6-8_Norther
n_Ireland_Protocol.pdf.
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a. reimburse duties levied pursuant to the provisions of
Union law made applicable by paragraph 3 in respect
of goods brought into Northern Ireland;
b. provide for circumstances in which a customs debt
which has arisen is to be waived in respect of goods
brought into Northern Ireland;
c. provide for circumstances in which customs duties
are to be reimbursed in respect of goods that can be
shown not to have entered the Union; and
d. compensate undertakings to offset the impact of the
application of paragraph 3.
This shows that not only the management of the levying
and collection of EU duties but also the management of
refunds and reimbursements is a task of UK customs. It
also follows from the mere fact that according to Article
5(3) of the Protocol EU customs law applies if goods are
considered at risk of moving into the EU.
Somewhat puzzling is the first paragraph of Article
5(6):
Customs duties levied by the United Kingdom in
accordance with paragraph 3 are not remitted to the
Union.
This seems to indicate that EU customs duties on goods
brought into Northern Ireland, even if these goods ulti-
mately end up in the EU, are not to be remitted to the
EU. Under this provision the UK, apparently, can keep
revenues from EU customs duties legally collected on
goods destined for the EU. However, an alternative
interpretation of Article 5 (6) could be that it merely
tries to indicate that customs duties applicable in the
UK in respect of goods moved into Northern Ireland
are not to be remitted to the EU. After all these customs
duties are levied according to the EU customs legisla-
tion, the UCC being applicable in the UK in respect of
Northern Ireland. Further clarification is needed here.
4 Conclusions
As discussed earlier, execution of the arrangement is in
the hands of UK customs authorities, who will have a
difficult task. Whether for businesses and UK customs
authorities the Protocol will be a workable solution will
greatly depend on the work to be done by the Joint
Committee. If the Joint Committee succeeds in setting
objective criteria to determine when goods are at risk, it
will be clear upon import into Northern Ireland whether
EU customs duties or UK customs duties apply.
However, where a good is regarded at risk and subject to
EU duties, the UK authorities can, nevertheless, grant
refunds if that good in the end stays within the UK.
Needless to say, this also will involve a lot of work for
the UK customs authorities and businesses. It will spe-
cifically apply to UK ‘at risk’ goods moving into North-
ern Ireland (third country ‘at risk’ goods will be subject
to EU duties as well, and if the EU duty rate is higher
than the UK one, a refund is also necessary if the good
stays within the UK).
That being said, it is also clear that in any event the new
arrangement will lead to checks and border controls
between the UK and Northern Ireland. Businesses in
the UK moving goods to Northern Ireland will have to
file customs declarations to do so. These customs decla-
rations must be processed by the UK customs authori-
ties in Northern Ireland, and goods coming from the
UK must checked by them. Essentially, this entails a
‘border’ in the Irish Sea between Northern Ireland and
the rest of the UK. All this is a consequence of the UK-
EU agreement on having EU customs law being applied
in and to Northern Ireland.15
The Institute for Government has stated that the Proto-
col will almost certainly be undeliverable by December
2020,16 The reason being the complicated arrangement
for Northern Ireland that needs to be translated to new
procedures and computer systems, combined with the
insistence of the UK Government that there will be few
physical checks (thus triggering a need for electronic
procedures rather than physical ones). In conclusion,
the Institute for Government warns of a major disrup-
tion for businesses, because systems and procedures will
almost certainly not be ready by the end of 2020. It also
warns that the UK may find itself before the EU Court
of Justice, because the implementation of the border
arrangement falls entirely on the UK and the UK may
not be able to deliver on time.
It can be concluded that the Irish border issue has been
resolved, but in complicated legislation, whose imple-
mentation falls entirely on the UK. It remains to be seen
whether the Irish border will be ready in time. It might
well be that the end of the Irish border saga is not there
(yet). The UK will be paying a high price for getting
Brexit done, keeping the Irish border open and protect-
ing the integrity of the internal market of the EU.
15. Although the UK government has stated on several occasions that no
border will be present in the Irish sea, see for example: The Guardian,
20 January 2020, the Irish border issue could land UK in court, report
finds. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/jan/13/brexit-irish-
border-uk-northern-ireland.
16. Institute for Government, Getting Brexit done, What happens now?,
IfG Insight, January 2020, p. 18.
232
ELR 2019 | No. 3 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000146
